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Argument 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT RULE 65A(C)(2) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES NOT PERMIT THE RECOVERY OF 
EXPENSES NECESSARILY INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST A WRONGFULLY 
ENTERED INJUNCTION. 
In response to Green River Canal Company's (GRCC) argument that, since it 
prevailed at the preliminary injunction hearing, it was entitled to have its expert witness fees 
and other litigation costs awarded pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Thayn seems to argue that this Court in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984), refused to grant attorney fees under Rule 65A. 
(See Thayn's Second Brief (Sec. Brief) 38.) Because this Court refused to permit attorney 
fees, Thayn's argument continues, the legislature amended Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to explicitly permit attorney fees. (See id.) Accordingly, he implicitly 
argues that GRCC's argument fails for two reasons: (1) if the legislature had intended Rule 
65 A to allow for the recovery of expert witness fees it would have explicitly so stated; and 
(2) GRCC is attempting to circumvent the Mountain States holding by arguing that expert 
witness fees are recoverable as "damages" and not as "costs." (See id.) 
There are several very significant problems with this argument, not the least of which 
is that Thayn mistakenly assumes that Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
amended by the Utah legislature. Of course, unless the Utah legislature votes by a two-thirds 
majority to amend the rules adopted by this Court, the amendment of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure is vested entirely with this Court by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
4849-4687-1552 GR255 007 1 
Constitution. The amendment of this rule was not, however, made by the legislature. (See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A, History & Notes.) 
The second serious problem with this argument is that it assumes that Mountain States 
held that a party could not recover attorney fees. However, this Court explicitly stated that 
under Rule 65A a wrongfully enjoined party "has an action for costs and damages incurred 
as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. These damages ... may include the attorney 
fees of the party wrongfully enjoined." 681 P.2d at 1262 (emphasis added). The Court then 
allowed an action to establish those damages to proceed. 
These two critical errors in Thayn's argument severely undercut the conclusions he 
implicitly draws. Because (1) Mountain States allowed an action to establish the amount of 
attorney fees under Rule 65 A to continue and (2) the legislature did not amend the rules in 
reaction to a strict interpretation of the rule by the Court, one cannot infer that the 
amendment was a reaction to a strict interpretation of the rule in a Supreme Court case. 
Not only are the assumptions underlying Thayn's arguments incorrect, he also 
misapprehends GRCC's argument. GRCC's argument is simply that the trial court was 
incorrect when it explicitly ruled that Rule 54 and Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure must be interpreted in exactly the same way. Mountain States makes clear that 
such an interpretation is wrong—Rule 65A is not interpreted consistently with Rule 54, 
otherwise attorney fees would never have been collectable under Rule 65A. The logic of 
Mountain States and the cases that this Court relied on in Mountain States make clear that, 
just as attorney fees are collectible, any expense necessarily incurred due to a wrongful 
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injunction is collectible. See 681 P.2d at 1262, n.7 (citing Coggins v. Wright, 526 P.2d 741 
(Anz. Ct. App. 1974); Unity Light & Power Co. v. Burley, 445 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1968); Shultz 
v. Pascoe, 614 P.2d 1083 (N.M. 1980)).1 
In this case, GRCC's property was put in jeopardy by the wrongful injunction placed 
on it by Thayn. In order to recover the property, it was necessary for GRCC to incur expert 
witness fees and other expenses to fight the continued imposition of the wrongful injunction 
at the preliminary injunction hearing held on March 23, 1999. GRCC contends that even if 
the expenses incurred to overturn the wrongfully obtained temporary restraining order are 
not considered costs under the rule, they should be considered as "damages", just as attorney 
fees were prior to the 1991 amendments to Rule 65A. 
Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly concluded that expert witness fees and the 
other costs of litigation were not "costs" or "damages" recoverable under Rule 65 A of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION W H E N IT FAILED TO REQUIRE 
THE DISGORGEMENT OF THAYN'S PROFITS. 
In response to GRCC's argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
failed to require the disgorgement of Thayn's profits from his hydroelectric facility, Thayn 
1
 In Coggins, for instance, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: 
If one's property is taken, injured, or put in jeopardy by another's neglect of 
duty imposed by contract, or by his wrongful act, any necessary expense 
incurred for its recovery, repair, or protection is an element of the injury. It is 
often the legal duty of the injured party to incur such expense to prevent or 
limit the damages, and, if it is judicious and made in good faith, it is 
recoverable, though abortive. 
526 P.2d at 743 (quoting First Nat 7 Bank v. Williams, 63 P. 744 (Kan. 1901)). 
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responds with essentially three arguments: (1) the trial court's order denying the motion for 
entry of judgment was not inconsistent with its summary judgment order, (2) GRCC failed 
to produce any evidence of Thayn's profits, and (3) the law does not allow the disgorgement 
of profits. GRCC will respond to each of these arguments in turn. 
A. The Trial Court's Inconsistencies 
First, Thayn argues that the order denying the motion to enter judgment on the Third 
Cause of Action was not inconsistent with the trial court's previous summary judgment 
order. In support of this argument, Thayn makes several claims. First, he argues that 
"[nowhere] in the record did GRCC specifically move for judgment on the third cause of 
action." (Sec. Brief 40.) Second, Thayn claims that the trial court was not really granting 
summary judgment on the third cause of action but rather was granting summary judgment 
as to the claim that the affirmative defense of eminent domain "did not preclude the third . 
. . cause of action." (Id.) 
The actual language of the motion and the memoranda supporting and opposing the 
motion belie this argument. As discussed at length in its first brief, GRCC alleged in the 
Third Cause of Action of its Complaint that "Thayn has realized economic gain from the 
commercial sale of electrical power generated by water diverted and conveyed by [GRCC's] 
diversion and distribution facilities, but has not compensated [GRCC] for the additional and 
unauthorized use of [GRCC's] diversion works and water distribution facilities to generate 
such economic gain." (CompL | 18.) Accordingly, it sought "an Order granting [GRCC] an 
equitable portion of the proceeds from the commercial sale of electrical power by Thayn." 
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On June 26, 1996, GRCC filed a iMotion for Summary Judgment seeking the entry of 
"an Order of Summary Judgment granting [GRCC] the relief sought in the Complaint." In 
response to this motion, Thayn explicitly argued that GRCC was not entitled to the relief it 
was seeking on the Third Cause of Action, i.e., a share of Thayn's profits. (See R. at 15 In 
("Green River has pled that it is entitled to . . . relief, as follows: 1) A share of Thayn's 
profits . . . . The first claim, for a share of profits, can be dealt with quickly.") In 
responding, it argued that disgorgement of profits was not a proper remedy, citing the same 
cases that Thayn argues in its Second Brief to this Court. (See id. at 151n-151o, 15It.) 
Despite these arguments, on September 9, 1997, the trial court entered an order that explicitly 
granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, it is simply impossible to argue, as Thayn tries to, that GRCC did not 
specifically move for judgment on the third cause of action in its motion for summary 
judgment. It is equally disingenuous to argue that the only issue that was argued and decided 
was whether the eminent domain statutes were proper affirmative defenses against the third 
cause of action. Thayn himself recognized that GRCC was asking for summary judgment 
on the Third Cause of Action and for a share of profits, and he explicitly argued against it. 
The motion was unequivocally granted in the Court's order. Further, the court made 
clear that the only issue to be tried after the motion for summary judgment was "the issue on 
estoppel." Thus, the trial court's order granted summary judgment but left alive only one 
issue—whether GRCC was equitably barred from bringing its claims. The trial court's Order 
on Trial Procedure, dated April 28, 1999, confirms that this was the understanding of the 
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court and the parties. (See R. at 865 (discussing order of presentation of case on trial on the 
issue of estoppel).) Even more importantly, however, is Thayn's position in its post-trial 
briefs, which clearly state that "[ujnder the Court's pre-trial rulings, the issues of waiver, 
estoppel and laches on the part of the plaintiff were reserved for trial." (R. at 981; see also 
Appellant's Brief at 16.) Thus, the trial court's summary judgment order, the understanding 
of the trial court, and the understanding of the parties all confirm that the only issue to be 
tried with regard to the Third Cause of Action was whether GRCC was estopped from 
bringing the claim. Accordingly, the order's declaration that the only issue disposed of in 
the summary judgment motion was the issue of liability is a completely mistaken description 
of the summary judgment order that is tantamount to a change in a previous order of the trial 
court. 
Because of the change of position, the trial court was bound by this Court's 
jurispmdence to identify the narrow exception under which its previous order could be 
corrected. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995). Not only 
did the trial court fail to do so, but it could not under any circumstance justify the change of 
position under the narrowly defined exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine. There has 
not been an intervening change of controlling authority; there has been no new evidence 
presented or identified; and the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous nor would it 
work a manifest injustice. All the parties knew that the trial court had granted summary 
judgment on the third cause of action, except to the extent that Thayn could present evidence 
that GRCC was estopped from bringing the claim. The trial court therefore abused its 
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discretion when it failed to enter judgment for GRCC entitling it to the disgorgement of the 
Thayn's gross profits. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed to Award Gross 
Profits and/or Failed to Grant an Evidentiary Hearing. 
Further, given that the only issue reserved for trial was the issue of estoppel with 
regard to the Third Cause of Action, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse 
to award gross profits in the amount of $289,500.17 and/or to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the amount of gross profits due. 
In its motion for an award of gross profits, GRCC submitted a copy of one of Thayn's 
proposed trial exhibits, in which Thayn admitted that it had produced and sold electricity 
from the hydroelectric facilities. {See R. at 1547.) Although Thayn vigorously objected to 
the motion for entry of judgment and moved to strike the motion, he never objected to the 
accuracy of the information provided in the exhibit nor did he object to the figure derived 
from that exhibit, i.e., a gross profit in the amount of $289,500.17. {See R. at 1566-76.) 
Further, Thayn did not object to the request for an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
amount of gross profits from March 1999 to the present date (the time period excluded from 
the exhibit). Accordingly, even if the trial court were correct to rule that GRCC was 
obligated to present evidence of gross profits during the trial, GRCC did provide evidence 
with its motion. 
As mentioned above, Thayn never objected to the accuracy of the amounts when the 
motion was submitted at the trial court. Accordingly, he waived any objection to the 
correctness of the amounts. State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529, 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
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(defendant's failure to make contemporaneous, specific objection to allegedly improper 
prosecutorial conduct precluded appellate review).2 The trial court therefore abused its 
discretion when it ruled that GRCC had failed to meet its evidentiary burden. 
Even assuming that any evidentiary objection was not waived, the trial court abused 
its discretion when it failed, in the alternative, to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the 
amount of the gross profits to be disgorged from Thayn. As is apparent from the discussion 
above, the trial court granted summary judgment for GRCC and reserved only the issue of 
estoppel for trial. Pursuant to the summary judgment order, GRCC was entitled to 
disgorgement of Thayn's property. Thus, the trial court should, at the very least, have 
ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of profits to be disgorged. 
C. Disgorgement is a Proper Remedy 
Finally, Thayn argues that Utah case law supports its position that GRCC should not 
be permitted to disgorge the profits it retained from the sale of electricity, because, he claims, 
the only remedy available in such a case is damage for the diminution in the value of the 
canal company's property. In support of his position he relies on two Utah cases: Tanner v. 
Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 P. 584 (1911), and Salt Lake City v. 
East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911). The citation to these cases 
reveals once again that Thayn has misapprehended the basis of GRCC's claims. 
2
 Thayn now argues that he could have shown that there were no profits had there 
been a hearing. However, the record clearly shows that Thayn never argued that in response 
to the motion for the entry of judgment on the Third Cause of Action. Thus, he waived the 
argument and should not be allowed to now present it here. 
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Both of these cases involved a water right owner's use of the statutory right of 
eminent domain to condemn a private canal owner's canal to permit the transportation of 
water. In each of these cases, a litigant sought to enforce the right to use existing facilities 
owned by a private party to transport the litigant's water to its place of use. In each of those 
cases the private party owning the facilities sought to recover under the eminent domain 
statute not only the damage to the existing canal but also to recover for the benefit conferred 
to the litigant diverting the water using the private party's facilities. 
In each of these cases, the litigants were relying on the condemnation power of the 
eminent domain statute, which explicitly limits the compensation to be paid to "'the damage, 
if any, caused by said enlargement'" of the property at issue. See Tanner, 121 P. at 585; East 
Jordan, 121 P. at 593. Accordingly, this Court ruled that for eminent domain purposes the 
proper measure of damages is the diminution in value to the property—not the benefit to the 
litigant condemning the property. See Tanner, 121 P. at 589-90 ("Counsel, however, urge 
that to permit respondent to use their canals as contemplated will be of great advantage, and 
may result in considerable profit to him. This may be so, and yet the question remains, In 
what way does what he is permitted to do damage appellants? They are limited in their 
recovery by the amount of damages suffered by them."); East Jordan, 121 P. at 595 ("We 
will now proceed to a consideration of the principal question arising upon appellant's appeal, 
namely: What is the measure of damages that should prevail in proceedings of this kind? 
In other words, what rule should be adopted in ascertaining and determining the 'just 
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compensation' required by the Constitution to be made to the owner of the canal which is 
sought to be enlarged?,,) 
This case, of course, is distinct. In this case, Thayn did not attempt to use the power 
of eminent domain to obtain rights to use the canal. His predecessors-in-interest entered into 
a contract with GRCC. Under a long line of Utah cases discussed in GRCC's initial brief, 
(see Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant (GRCC Brief) 26), private agreements between 
parties are controlling and statutory rights of eminent domain apply only in the absence of 
such agreements. See, e.g., West Union Canal Co. v. Thornley, 228 P. 199 (Utah 1924); 
Peterson v. Sevier Valley Canal Co., 151 P.2d 477 (Utah 1944); Gunnison-Fayette Canal Co. 
v. Roberts, 364 P.2d 103 (Utah 1961). For instance, in Peterson, this Court unequivocally 
held that "if the parties can agree on the joint use of the ditch condemnation is not necessary. 
In that event if the parties agree on the amount to be paid for the use, or on the basis for 
determination of the amount such contract controls." 151 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, because Thayn had already obtained rights to the use of the canal through 
agreement, the agreements controlled the relationship between the parties. However, in 
contravention of the contractual rights detailed in the agreement, Thayn used the facility for 
uses not authorized by the agreements without authority to do so. 
The law is clear about how it treats a person who wrongfully converts the use and 
benefits of another's property. In such circumstances, the converter is not entitled to profit 
from his or her wrongdoing, and the person who owns the property at issue is entitled to the 
disgorgement of all gross profits which the converter received by his wrongful acts. 
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In Cablevision v. Tann/iauser Condominium Ass'n, 649 P.2d 1093 (Col. 1982) (en 
banc), for instance, Cablevision had "constructed several antennas on a mountain peak near 
Breckenridge[, Colorado], by which it receive[d] six television stations as well as FM radio." 
Id. at 1095. Cablevision then used these facilities to provide cable service to its customers 
in Breckenridge. Id. Thereafter, a condominium association contracted with Cablevision to 
provide cable service to all of the condominium units in its complex. Id. Cablevision 
installed an amplifier inside the condominium complex and transmitted the signals to devices 
previously installed in the walls of the thirty-three individual units by Cablevision. Id. The 
condominium association paid for this service for a period of approximately two years. Id. 
After two years, the association discontinued service to thirty units and kept only 
service to three. Id. The association, however, connected its own amplifier to the 
Cablevision line servicing the three units and provided, via its own amplifier, service to the 
other thirty units. Id. The condominium complex was subsequently expanded and an 
additional twenty-five units were serviced by the association's addition of another cable line 
placed in the complex. Id. After approximately two and one-half years, Cablevision 
discovered the condominium association's unauthorized use and terminated service. Id. It 
then brought suit to recover the monthly amount due for each of the fifty-five units' use of 
the service during the period the association only paid for service to the three units. Id. 
Stating that "Cablevision does have a legally protected interest in the reception, 
processing and distribution system it has installed and in the service that this system enables 
Cablevision to provide," id. at 1098, the court ruled: 
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By retransmission of the signals purchased in connection with three 
[condominium] units to non-subscribers, the defendants have undercut 
Cablevision's ability to sell its signal to these other potential customers. These 
business realities highlight the inequity of permitting the defendants to retain 
the benefits of Cablevision's services without payment of its value. 
Id. at 1097-98. The Court relied heavily on the Restatement of Restitution (1937) in its 
analysis, and concluded that "[ujnder these facts, restitution is appropriate to avoid unjust 
enrichment to the defendants." Id. at 1098.3 
Other courts have engaged in similar types of analysis for various other factual 
situations. For instance, in a case involving a corporation's minority shareholders' action 
seeking the disgorgement of all "ill-gotten gains made through [diverting] loan business," 
the court ruled that restitution was appropriate to recover the total amounts diverted by the 
corporation's board of directors to a competitor with substantial ties to the board. Warren 
v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987) (emphasis added). In 
addition, courts routinely award real property owners all gross revenues or profits made by 
3
 Interestingly, the condominium association made the same argument that Thayn 
made below. Arguing that because "Cablevision acquire[d] its signals free of charge, . . . it 
ha[d] no legally protected interest in those images and transmissions." Id. at 1098. In other 
words because Cablevision did not own the television signals, Cablevision was not entitled 
to damages when the condominium association used the signals and did not pay Cablevision 
for them. Stating that although it did "not acquire an exclusive right in the broadcast signals 
it receives," the Court ruled that "Cablevision does have a legally protected interest in the 
reception, processing and distribution system it has installed and in the service that this 
system enables Cablevision to provide." Id. at 1098. 
In the trial court, Thayn had made the same argument, i.e., that because GRCC did not 
own the water, it could not complain when Thayn used more water than he was entitled to. 
However, it was not the water about which GRCC was complaining, it was the illegal use of 
its facilities, i.e., the dam, raceway, sluice gates, and other diversion structures, for financial 
gain. 
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trespassers who produce oil or gas from lands on which they have trespassed. See, e.g., 
Cassinos v. Union Oil Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Loeb v. Conley, 169 
S.W. 575 (Ky. 1914); Pittsburg & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co., 100 S.E. 296 
(W. Va. 1919). 
The underlying premise of requiring the disgorgement of all of the gross profits of 
those who have wrongfully converted property to their own use, whether that disgorgement 
arises out of a claim of unjust enrichment, conversion, or trespass, is that "the law allows a 
plaintiff to maximize recovery and thus prevent a converter from profiting from wrongful 
acts." Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Utah 1993). As has been 
thoroughly explained: 
The unifying theme of various restitutionary tools is the prevention of unjust 
enrichment. Equity courts have fashioned the fiction of a constructive trust in 
order to force restitution from one who was unjustly enriched. The 
Restatement of Restitution also uses the constructive trust device to explain the 
essence of this relief. It starts with the general principle that restitution will be 
available whenever one has received a benefit to which another is justly 
entitled. The inequity of retaining a benefit can spring from a variety of 
sources, such as fraud or other unconscionable conduct in which the recipient 
has received a benefit for which he has not responded with a quid pro quo. 
The remedy in restitution rests on the ancient principles of disgorgement. 
Beneath the cloak of restitution lies the dagger that compels the conscious 
wrongdoer to "disgorge" his gain. Disgorgement is designed to deprive the 
wrongdoer of all gains flowing from the wrong rather than to compensate the 
victim of that fraud. In modern legal usage the term has frequently been 
extended to include a dimension of deterrence. Disgorgement is said to occur 
when a "defendant is made to 'cough up' what he got, neither more nor less." 
From centuries back equity has compelled a disloyal fiduciary to "disgorge" 
his profits. He is held chargeable as a constructive trustee of the ill-gotten 
gains in his possession. A constructive trustee who consciously 
misappropriates the property of another is often refused allowance even of his 
actual expenses. Where a wrongdoer is shown to have been a conscious, 
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deliberate misappropriator of another's commercial values, gross profits are 
recoverable through a restitutionary remedy. 
Warren, 741 P.2d at 852 (footnotes omitted). 
Under these restitutionary doctrines, when a conscious wrongdoer profits unjustly 
from activities conducted with someone else's property, the person owning the property is 
entitled to have all profits disgorged, without any reduction for amounts expended by the 
conscious wrongdoer. See id.', Howard v. Kingmont Oil Co., 729 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1987) ("Where encroachment is willful, i.e., deliberate and knowing, a trespasser will 
be liable for the full value of the oil extracted. Where encroachment is innocent. . . damages 
may be reduced by the proportionate costs of producing the oil."); Edwards v. Lachman, 534 
P.2d 670, 674-75 (Okla. 1975) (explaining that conscious wrongdoer must disgorge all 
profits, "without deducting therefrom a reasonable cost of developing and producing the 
same"); accord Pittsburg & West Virginia Gas Co., 100 S.E. at 296-98; Johnson v. Kansas 
Natural Gas Co., 135 P. 589, 590-91 (Ka. 1913); Maxvill-Glasco Drilling Co. v. Royal Oil 
& Gas Corp., 800 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
The Restatement of Restitution § 151, which has been cited approvingly by this 
Court,4 defines the rule as follows: "[a] person who tortiously has acquired, retained or 
disposed of another's property with knowledge that such conduct is wrongful is entitled to 
no profits therefrom. Therefore, he is subject to liability at the election of the rightful owner 
for the value of anything received in exchange therefor. He is also liable for profits made by 
4
 See Alta Industries Ltd., 846 P.2d at 1291 n.23. 
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its use." Restatement of Restitution § 151 cmt. f (1937). The Restatement illustrates this rule 
with the following two examples. 
Knowing that he has no right so to do A enters Bfs timber tract and thereon 
cuts trees which have a value of $1000 when cut. He has them sawed into 
boards which are carried to the city at which place they are worth $2000. B 
is entitled to recover $2000 from A by way of restitution. 
Id. cmt. d ill. 5. Also, 
A, mistakenly believing that he has a contract with B for the delivery of goods, 
delivers goods of the value of $1000. B receives them, knowing that A was 
mistaken and consigns them to C with directions to sell them for Bfs account. 
C sells the goods for $1200. A is entitled to restitution from B in the amount 
of$1200. 
The present case clearly falls within the restitutionary rules. This is not a case where 
a person sought to condemn a canal, but rather, despite controlling contractual language that 
clearly delineated each party's rights to the diversion structures, one party breached the 
contract and sought to profit from that breach. Although Thayn's contractual right to use the 
dam, raceway, and diverting works was limited to diverting water for irrigation and creating 
only enough energy to pump that irrigation water to his canal, Thayn began using, in 1992, 
the energy created by the dam and raceway to create hydroelectric power for sale. He did 
not, however, have the contractual right to use the dam, raceway, or the energy GRCC 
harnessed to do so. 
Accordingly, Thayn has been consciously profiting from the use of GRCC s property 
since 1992, although he had no contractual right to do so. This action constitutes either 
conversion, i.e., "exercis[ing] dominion or control over goods inconsistent with the owner's 
rights," Alta Industries Ltd., 846 P.2d at 1290 n.18, or trespass, i.e., "physical invasion of 
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. . . land," Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998). By Thayn's 
wrongful conversion, it is clear that he has been unjustly enriched. See American Towers 
Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc, 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996) ("There must 
be (1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit 
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit 
without payment of its value.") (citations omitted). Because he has consciously used property 
to which he has no contractual right and which rightfully belongs to GRCC, it would be 
inequitable for Thayn to benefit from that conduct. 
Accordingly, GRCC is entitled to restitution from Thayn and such an award is both 
appropriate and permitted. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RADIAL SLUICE 
GATES WERE APPURTENANT TO THE PUMPHOUSE. 
Finally, Thayn argues that the trial court did not err when it found that the radial sluice 
gates were appurtenances that existed at the time of the 1952 agreement. He contends that 
three inferences can be drawn from the existing evidence that supports the trial court's 
findings: (1) the existing concrete structure is evidence of the existence of the gates in 1952; 
(2) because radial sluice gates are necessary for the operation of the raceway, the radial sluice 
gates must have existed; and (3) the Agreements use of the word "diverting works" evidences 
the existence of the radial sluice gates. GRCC will respond to each of these arguments in 
turn. 
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A. There Is No Evidence that Any Monolithic Structure Existed in 1952 
In responding to GRCC's appeal, Thayn returns to the argument he made below, i.e., 
that "the south wall of the radial sluice way is the footing for the north wall of the pump 
house." (Sec. Brief 45.) He then proceeds to make the argument that the pump house would 
collapse without that wall. (See id.) This, of course, is mere sophistry. 
It is true that the north wall of the pump house defines the south end of the radial 
sluice gate spillway. However, despite what Thayn states on page 45 in his brief, there was 
no testimony about the age of any of the concrete in the spillway. This is evidenced by the 
fact that Thayn cannot cite to one portion of the record in which any witness testifies 
regarding the age of the concrete. In fact, the only evidence about the age of any structure 
is exhibit 85 in which Rick Kaster clearly identifies the north wall, but not the radial sluice 
gate spillway, as being part of the old part of the building which was constructed some time 
prior to 1940. (See R. at 1895, 66-68; R. at 1902, v.4, 54; Ex. 85; R. at 1902, v. 9, 215. A 
copy of Exhibit 85 is attached to this brief as Exhibit A).D No inference can be drawn from 
the fact that the north wall also happens now to be next to the sluice gate spillway. As 
evidenced by Exhibit 85, the spillway is not dependent on the north wall, nor is the north 
wall dependent on the spillway. 
5
 Thayn states in footnote 41 of his Second Brief that Exhibit 85 says the newest 
portion of the pumphouse was constructed in approximately 1915. Although a notation of 
that date is made on the Exhibit, Mr. Kaster never testified to that date, and, in fact, testified 
in the preliminary injunction hearing that he surmised that the construction actually occurred 
sometime in the 1940s. (See R. at 1895, 66-68.) Although GRCC referenced this testimony 
in its brief, it cited to the wrong record page number. 
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Accordingly, the only "evidence" that can be cited for the existence of the sluice gates 
is wholly improper inference regarding the age of cement based upon pictures and 
observation of the existing facilities. The Court could not have concluded from observations 
of conditions existing in 1999 that the cement structure was in place in 1952. 
B. Court Cannot Infer that Radial Sluice Gates Existed from Necessity of 
Sluicing 
Thayn next argues that the court could have inferred the existence of the radial sluice 
gates in 1952 simply by the fact that sluice gates are necessary for the functioning of the 
raceway. {See Sec. Brief 46.) The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the 
particular radial sluice gates in question were necessary for sluicing in 1952 when there is 
absolutely no record support for this argument. Although it is true that sluicing is necessary 
for the proper operation of raceway, there is no evidence that the particular radial sluice gates 
in question were required for proper sluicing of the raceway. In fact, evidence was presented 
that one of the slide gates in the pumphouse could be used and had been used for sluicing the 
raceway. {See R. at 1902, v. 4, 52-53, Ex. 83.) Accordingly, it is neither fair nor reasonable 
to infer based upon the existence of the radial sluice gates in 1979 that those sluice gates 
existed in 1952 and were appurtenant to the pumphouse at that time.6 Other sluice gates 
6
 In fact, the 1952 Agreement, a copy of which is appended to this brief as Exhibit 
B, references the fact that "pits" existed from which Thayn's predecessors pumped their 
water. {See Ex. 45, at 1.) The evidence presented at trial never explained the absence of 
those "pits" or what happened to them. Obviously, it would be error for any fact finder to 
make an inference about the state of the property in 1952 based upon conditions in 1979. 
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existed and could have been used and no evidence was submitted showing the existence of 
the radial sluice gates in 1952. 
C. The 1952 Agreement 
Finally, Thayn argues that paragraph 4 of the 1952 Agreement serves as evidence that 
the radial sluice gates existed. By selective quotation of the paragraph7 and unnatural use of 
language,8 Thayn appears to argue that paragraph 4 defines a "diverting work" to only be 
those portions of the dam, raceway, and diverting system that are "integral to or essential to 
the use . . . of the other party." (See Sec. Brief 46.) Relying on this definition, he then argues 
that, because the "pump house, trash rack and wing walls are solely used by [Thayn] and 
only for [Thayn's] benefit," the parties must have believed that the Thayn would control the 
radial sluice gates since the only portion of the system that fit this definition of "diverting 
work" that Thayn could have possibly had control over were the radial sluice gates. (See id.) 
This argument also misses the mark. 
First, in the recitals to the 1952 Agreement clearly refers to all of the structures used 
for the diversion of water from the Green River, including the dam, raceway, canal, and all 
other structures on Lot 4 as "diverting works." (See Ex. 45, at 1. A copy of the 1952 
7
 Thayn's indented quotation of the paragraph fails to identify that significant portions 
of the paragraph have been removed and not quoted. 
8
 This Court recently reiterated that in interpreting language it would not arbitrarily 
ignore elementary rules of grammar and punctuation. State v. Huntington-Cleveland 
Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 40, ^  16. In order to arrive at the interpretation that Thayn suggests, 
the Court would be required to violate this basic principle of interpretation of language. 
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Agreement is attached as Exhibit B.) Lot 4 included all of the land at issue in this case from 
the dam to the pumphouse. In the recital found on page 2 of the agreement, it provides: 
[I]t is the desire of the parties hereto to forever settle and put at rest their 
differences and adopt a permanent plan for the operation of said diverting 
works and to also divide the area comprising said Lot 4 between them in 
accordance with their just needs and to their mutual advantage. 
(Id.) Accordingly, the 1952 agreement identified parcels of property that were to go to 
Thayn's predecessors and provided that GRCC was to convey to them those parcels. (See 
id. f 2.) GRCC was to possess the remainder of the property. (See id. | 3.) 
Paragraph 4 then makes clear that the diverting works located upon each of the party's 
respective parcels were to be owned by the party owning the parcel upon which the diverting 
works were located. {See id. ^ 4.) Specifically, paragraph 4 of the 1952 Agreement provides 
in relevant part: 
The ownership, maintenance, upkeep, repair, supervision, control and 
operation of the said raceway and diverting works situated upon the real 
property [of the Canal Company] as well as the ownership, maintenance^, 
upkeep, repair, supervision, control and operation of said dam shall be and 
remain with the [Canal Company] at all times. The ownership, maintenance, 
upkeep, repair, supervision, control and operation of said diverting works 
situated upon the lands [of Thayn] shall be and remain with [Thayn]. Each 
party agrees to keep the portion of said diverting works under its supervision 
in a state of reasonably good repair and condition so that insofar as the 
diverting works situated on the lands [of each party] respectively of this 
agreement are integral to or essential to the use, operation, and enjoyment of 
the other party that the same will be maintained and kept in reasonably good 
repair and condition at all times. . . . 
Paragraph 4 continues by stating that the parties will share the expenses for the maintenance 
or repair "of said dam, diverting works, raceway or lands adjacent thereto which are jointly 
used by the parties." 
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The language and meaning of Paragraph 4 is clear: each party knew and expected that 
all of the diverting works were integral or essential to the other party's enjoyment of their 
property interests and water rights. Accordingly, they agreed to keep the portions of the 
diverting system that they owned in good repair and condition. 
Thayn's argument is not consistent with the clear meaning of the contractual 
language. The parties did not define "diverting works" to only mean those parts of the 
diversion system that could be used by both parties. Rather, the parties used the term 
"diverting works" to include all of the parts of the diversion system, including those parts of 
the system that were used solely by either party and for their sole benefit. 
Additionally, this argument assumes the very fact in question. In other words, before 
the trial court could find that the radial sluice gates were a "diverting work", it would have 
to know that radial sluice gates existed. Once again, there is no evidence of that the radial 
sluice gates that existed in 1979 existed in 1952 at the time of the entry of the 1952 
Agreement. 
D. The Trial Court Clearly Erred 
Thayn conceded in post-trial briefing that he "could not testify concerning the 
condition of the radial gates 50 years ago." (R. at 1478). The fact is that no one testified that 
the radial sluice gates existed at the time of the 1952 Agreement. Thayn's concessions and 
this evidence are absolutely fatal since GRCC could not have deeded what it did not have in 
1952. Because there is no evidence that the radial sluice gates existed in 1952, and Thayn 
has conceded that the radial sluice gates are not located on parcel B, Thayn failed to meet his 
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burden to establish that the sluice gates were appurtenant to the property at issue in 1952, 
and, thus, passed to his predecessors-in-interest. Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred 
when it found that the radial sluice gates were appurtenant to the pump house in 1952. 
Conclusion 
GRCC was wrongfully enjoined and is entitled to all of its expert witness fees and 
litigation related expenses. Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed 
to enter judgment on GRCC's Third Cause of Action, disgorging profits from Thayn during 
the time that he earned profits from his illegal use of GRCC facilities. Finally, the trial court 
clearly erred when it ruled that the radial sluice gates were appurtenant to the pump house. 
Accordingly, GRCC requests that this Court affirm the trial court's order on GRCC's 
claims and reverse the trial court's order which refused to award expert witness fees and 
other litigation related expenses incurred as a result of the preliminary injunction proceeding. 
Further, GRCC requests that the Court reverse the trial court's order refusing to enter 
judgment on the Third Cause of Action and remand to the trial court to disgorge profits in 
the amount of 5289,500.17 and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of 
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gross profits earned from March 1999 to the present. Finally, GRCC requests that the Court 
reverse the trial court's finding that the radial sluice gates are appurtenant to the pump house. 
DATED this Z U day of April, 2002. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
f3 B. Hartvig^en 
D. SCOTT€TOOI 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
Green River Canal Company 
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A . G R . E E M E N T 
This agreement made and entered into this 5th day of April, 
1952, by and between GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
with its principal place of business at Green River, Utah, First 
Party, and S. M. WILSON, STEWART B. WILSON, LORIN H. YJILSON, M. J. 
WILSON and F« M. WILSON, doing business as co-partners under the 
name and style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, Second Party, 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the first party is a mutual irrigation company and 
for many years has been and nov/ is diverting waters from the Green 
River in Emery County, Utah, by means of a dam across said Green 
River and by use of a certain race way, canal and other diverting 
works in connection therewith; and 
WHEREAS, the second party is the owner of most of the lands 
lying under what is commonly knov/n as the 42-foot canal which lands 
are likewise irrigated by waters diverted from the said Green River 
by means of said dam and diverting works, and the w?ters are there-
upon pumped from pits at the end of said race way into the said 42-
foot canal and thence transported through said 42-foot canal to 
the said lands of the second party; and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto on January 2, 1930 made and 
entered into a certain agreement pertaining to the said dam, di-
verting works, race way, pits and other properties situated upon 
Lot 4, Section 17, Township 20 South, Range 16 East of the Salt 
Lake Meridian; and 
WHEREAS, disputes have arisen from time to time between the 
parties hereto with respect to said agreement and the respective 
rights and obligations of the parties hereto thereunder and an 
action was filed by the first party against the Green River Irri-
gation Company and others in the Efistrict Court Within and for 
Emery County, State of Utah, in v/hich action the second party 
appeared as an intervenor and in which action a judgment ana decree 
was executed on August 19, 1939 by District Judge Lewis Jones and 
said judgment provided, among other things, that the second party 
by reason of the said contract of January 2, 1930 was estopped to 
assert or claim that the first party was not the owner of said Lot 
4 and the improvements thereon so long as said contract should re-
main in force and effect; and 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto to forever 
settle and put at rest their differences and adopt a permanent 
plan for the operation -of said diverting works and to also divide 
the area comprising said Lot 4 betv/een them in accordance with 
their just needs and to their mutual advantage; and 
YIHEREAS, on or about July 15, 1942 the Green River Irriga-
tion Company filed an action in the District Court Within and for 
Emery County, State of Utah, against the first party herein seek-
ing to quiet title to said Lot 4 and in said action the first 
party herein filed a counter-claim seeking to quiet its title to 
said Lot 4 and said action has not *s yet been disposed of; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premiss and of the 
covenants herein set forth and in the event and only in the event 
the first party is successful in the said pending litigation be-
tween/it and the Green River Irrigation Company to the end that 
title to said Lot 4 is finally quieted in the first party, then 
it is understood and agreed as follows: 
1. Said agreement of January 2, 1930 between the parties 
hereto shall be terminated. 
2. The first party shall convey to the second party by 
quitclaim deed the following portions of said Lot 4 in Emery 
County, State of Utah: 
-2-
{ 
Beginning at the southwest corner of Lot 4, Sectiojt 
17, Township 20 South, Range 16 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence east 195 feet; 
thence north 1 052' east 285 feet; thence north 0°24• 
west 97 feet; thence vest 200 fleet; thencp south 383 
feet more or less to the point of beginning, together 
with all improvements thereon and appurtenances there-
unto belonging. Subject to the County Road right of 
way, and subject to the right in the first party to 
use in common with the second party the private road 
which leads from the said County Road to the pumping 
plant situated on the parcel of land described in 
Parcel B of paragraph 2. of this agreement and sub-
ject also to a right of way in the first party which 
is particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 195 feet east of the southwest 
corner of said Lot 4 artd running thence north' 50 feet; 
thence west to the said County Road right of way; 
thence southerly along said County Road right of way 
to a point due west of the place of beginning; thence 
east to the point of beginning. 
Ea.rc.dLJi* 
Beginning at a point 245 feet east and 170 feet north 
.of the southwest corner of Lot 4, Section 17, *ownship 
#20 South, Range 16 East of the Salt Lake Base and 
^Meridian; and running thence south 80° 00' east 69 feet; 
thence north 6° 00• east 220 feet; thence north 87° 00' 
west 55 feetj thence south 13° 00' east 90 feet; thence 
south 7° 30' west 110 feet more or less to the point of 
beginning, together with all improvements thereon and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
3. The second party shall make, execute and deliver to the 
first party a quitclaim deed to the following described real prop-
erty in Emery County, State of Utah: 
All of said Lot 4, less the lands described in paragraph 
No. 2 immediately next preceeding. 
4. ^he ownership, maintenance, upkeep, repair, supervision, 
control and operation of the said race way and diverting works 
situated upon the real property described in paragraph 3. of this 
agreement as well as the ownership, maintenances, upkeep, repair, 
supervision', control and operation of said dam shall be and remain 
with the first party at all times. The ownership, maintenance, 
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upkeep, repair, supervision, control and operation of said divert-
ing works situated upon the lands hereinabove described in para-
graph 2. shall be and remain with the second party. Each party 
agrees to keep the portion of said diverting works under its super-
vision in a state of reasonably good repair and condition so that 
insofar as the diverting works situated on the lands described in 
paragraphs 2.and 3. respectively of this agreement are integral 
to or essential to the use, operation and enjoyment of the other 
party that the same will be maintained and kept in reasonably good 
repair and condition at all times. In this connection it is under-
stood and agreed that the water belonging to the second party (just 
be diverted by means of said dam and by means of the said race way 
and diverting works situated on the lands described in paragraph 
3. hereof and the second party agrees to annually pay on or before 
the 1st day of February of each year commencing with the year 1953, 
one-half of the cost of the maintenance, control, supervision, re-
pair, upkeep and operation of said dam, diverting works, race way 
and all other property described in paragraph 3. which are joint-
ly used by the parties hereto. The first party shall furnish to 
the second party on or before the 1st day of January of the year 
1953 and on or before January 1 of each succeeding year an item-
ized statement of the said expenses for the preceeding twelve-
month period. It is specifically provided, however, that if the 
first party receives from any other person, firm or corporation, 
any consideration in money,,work or otherwise for the maintenance, 
upkeep, repair, supervision or control of said dara, diverting works, 
race way or lands adjacent thereto which are jointly used by the 
parties then and in that event the consideration so received shall 
first be deducted from the whole of said expenses and .after said 
deductions the remainder of said expenses shall be divided equally 
between the parties hereto. The second party shall pay its own 
and repair of the race way, pits and diversion works situated upon 
the property hereinabove described in paragraph 3, In the event 
the second party fails to pay its portion of said costs and ex-
penses as herein provided the second party shall not have the 
right to receive or divert any water through said diverting works 
until said costs shall have been paid together with interest on 
any delinquent sum at the rate of eight percent {&%) per annum. 
This remedy is specified for the benefit of the first party and 
is optional, cumulative and not exclusive. In other words, the 
first party may at its option also bring suit to enforce the pay-
ment of such amount or may pursue any other remedy which ma:y be 
available at law or equity. 
5* Each party hereto shall have the right at all reasonable 
times to enter upon and pass over the property of the other here-
inabove described in connection with the reasonable use to be made 
by each party of the land to be quitclaimed to it as hereinabove 
particularly set forth and in particular but not by way of limita-
tion the first party shall have a right cf way to cross over the 
area which is now covered with planks in front of the pumping plant 
situated on the lands described in parcel 3 of paragraph 3 qbove 
and the road way leading thereto from the County Road* 
6. It is understood and agreed that before the party of the 
second part can or may use any water from said dam, diverting works 
or race way that the first party shall have enough and sufficient 
water to supply its stockholders. The quantity of water to supply 
the stockholders of the first party is to be exclusively determined 
by the first party, 
1. This agreement shall constitute a covenant running with 
the said lands in said Lot 4 insofar as the respective-parties, 
their successors and assigns are concerned, and it shall be binding 
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns 
of the respective parties. In this connection it is understood ana 
agreed that the second party contemplates the formation of an irri-
gation company to handle'and distribute waters under the said 42-
foot canal and that when and if any such company is formed by the 
second party then the second party shall have the right to convey 
the lands described in paragraph 2 # of this agreement to such new 
company and to assign this contract thereto. Neither the second 
party, nor its successor or assigns or their successive successors 
or assigns shall have the tight to make any such transfer and/or 
assignment to more than one corporation or partnership at any par-
ticular time because to so do would unduly burden the first party 
in its administration of said dam, race way and diverting works 
and in the collection of the monies to be paid by the second party, 
its successors and assigns, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands 
to this instrument in duplicate the day and year first above written, 
FIRST PARTY: 
ATTEST: GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a 
dorporation 
^71 . / B y ^ l ^ ^ a C ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l 
I t ' s S e c r e t a r y I t ' s P r e s i d e n t 
SECOND-PARTY: 
WILSON/^ RODUCE COMPANY, a 
c o -pj j t i»£ irgh i | 
/ is 
* £ 
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2^> ppeared before me this ^& day of April, * 
0. K. ANDERSON who duly acknowledged to me 
resident and Secretary, respectively, of the 
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thereof adopted at a special meeting du; 
such purpose and the said officers duly 
lid corporation executed said agreement* 
acknow-
My/£ommissiqn, e x a i r a d y ' No£a 
Res id ing .Utah 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
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ss 
Perconally appeared before me this =L2. day of April, 1952 
S. M. WILSON, STEWART B. WILSON, LORIN H. WILSON, M. J. WILSON 
and F. M. WILSON co-partners doing business under the name and 
style of WILSON PRODUCE COMPANY, a co-partnership, the signers of 
the foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged t»o me that they — 
executed -the same. 
My mission expires Notary Pub l i c 
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